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The Honorable Carol Los Mansmann touched the lives of many
people. I am among those whose lives were affected in a positive
manner by her spirit and grace. During the late 1970s and early
1980s, it was my good fortune to be a colleague of Judge Mans-
mann when she was a member of the faculty at the Duquesne
University School of Law. As a young professor, I was able to dis-
cuss classroom issues with her and learn from her experiences.
Her warmth and enthusiasm for the law were inspirational to all
who knew her. After she was appointed to the federal bench, I
was fortunate to continue my friendship with her and was present
in Washington, D.C. at the time she took her oath before Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor to become a federal district judge. Later,
she was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, and I was privileged to be present when she was
sworn in as an appellate judge by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
Throughout my legal career, I often would meet her for lunch and
discuss issues relevant to our lives, including child rearing and the
pressures and tensions of being a working mother. Carol, my
friend, was always willing to listen and lend assistance in any way
that she was able.
When I was involved in the process of becoming a federal dis-
trict judge, she was encouraging, and it was a great void in my life
when she died shortly before I was sworn in as a district judge. To
say that she is greatly missed in my life would be an understate-
ment. She still touches my life as a judge in many ways. As I was
preparing to write these remarks about her legacy as a judge, I
decided to focus on a significant decision she authored to see how
it withstood the test of time. Since, from the time I was a profes-
sor, I have had an academic interest in business law, I chose a de-
cision which had business connotations, Ballay v. Legg Mason
* United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania; J.D. summa
cum laude, Duquesne University; B.A., Duquesne University.
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Wood Walker, Inc. 1 My review of her written work was poignant
and brought to mind the many ways in which she touched my
life. 2
II. THE IMPORT OF BALLAY
A. The Ballay Decision
In Ballay, certain investors had sued Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc. ("Legg Mason"), a brokerage firm, seeking, among other
things, to rescind the purchase of certain securities due to alleged
oral misrepresentations. Whether rescission was an appropriate
remedy turned on an issue of first impression before a federal ap-
pellate court: "whether section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
affords a remedy to a buyer of securities in the secondary mar-
ket."3 In that decision, authored by Judge Mansmann, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded: "the lan-
guage and legislative history of section 12(2) demonstrate that
Congress did not there intend to protect buyers in the aftermar-
ket, and... [held] that section 12(2) provides a remedy to buyers
of securities only in the initial distributions."
4
The investors who sought rescission had purchased, through
Legg Mason, securities of Wickes Company, Inc. ("Wickes"). The
investors alleged that Legg Mason recommended Wickes as an
investment presenting "little 'downside' risk."5 Oral representa-
tions were allegedly made by one of Legg Mason's securities ana-
lysts based upon, among other things, a book value for Wickes
that excluded good will. In fact, good will was not excluded in the
book value calculation. Those misstatements were later corrected
by Legg Mason because much of Wickes' book value included good
will. The case went to trial and the jury found for the investors
with respect to their § 12(2) claim.
1. 925 F.2d 682 (3d. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
2. She is still doing so. During the time I was preparing these materials, I was also
drafting an opinion involving an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision. In doing legal
research I found a decision which was controlling for the issue that was raised in the ap-
peal. The decision, In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litigation, 235 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000), was
well written, and it was not surprising that it was authored by Judge Mansmann. In that
opinion, the court of appeals recognized that a court has a duty to explain how it weighed
equitable factors in determining whether late filings resulted from excusable neglect.
3. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 684.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 685.
Vol. 46
Fall 2007 Judicial Legacy of Carol Los Mansmann
Legg Mason sought judgment N.O.V., asserting that no violation
of § 12(2) could be found under the law because that section did
not apply to sales of securities in the secondary market. The dis-
trict court rejected Legg Mason's argument because "the plain
language of § 12(2) did not limit its application to initial distribu-
tions of securities and .. .the broad remedial purposes of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 were not rigidly restricted to initial distribu-
tions.' 6 Legg Mason appealed that unfavorable ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
To resolve that issue Judge Mansmann looked first to the lan-
guage of § 12(2), which read in pertinent part:
Any person who -
(2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or in-
struments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall sustain
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of such untruth or
omission,
shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this section, to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
7
One question raised was whether the oral communication at is-
sue in Ballay was an oral communication as contemplated by §
12(2). The key phrase which the court focused on was "by means
of a prospectus or oral communication." The court construed the
terms "prospectus" and "oral communication" as related terms and
6. Id. at 686-87.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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held that a buyer could bring suit under § 12(2) for "material mis-
representations made in a prospectus or in an oral communication
related to a prospectus or initial offering."8
To reach that conclusion the court utilized the statutory con-
struction canon, noscitur a sociis.9 Under that construction canon,
a term is to be construed in light of accompanying terms in order
to find its meaning. The court quoted from the Supreme Court's
decision in Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.:10 "[t]he maxim noscitur a
sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an
inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of
many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth
to the Acts of Congress.""
Applying that canon to the language in question, the court con-
cluded that an oral communication had to be related to a prospec-
tus because the term "prospectus" was the company the term "oral
communication" kept. 12 The court refined its analysis by focusing
on whether the term "prospectus" should have a broad or narrow
meaning. It concluded that the term "prospectus" was a "term of
art,"13 and as a term of art, "prospectus" concerned sales of securi-
ties in initial distributions, not in the secondary market. That
conclusion was supported by the use of the term "prospectus" in
other sections of the Securities Act, i.e., §§ 5(b)(1) and 10.14 A
broad reading of the term "prospectus" in § 12(2) would have unin-
tended consequences. If it had a broad meaning, a prospectus
would refer to any written communication. Congress could not
have intended to use the word "prospectus" in such a broad man-
8. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688 (emphasis added).
9. The phrase "noscitur a sociis" is "[a] canon of construction holding that the meaning
of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding
it." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004). Justice Antonin Scalia described the
canon in an essay discussing textualism:
Textualism is often associated with rules of interpretation called the canons of
construction - which have been widely criticized, indeed even mocked, by mod-
ern legal commentators. Many of the canons were originally in Latin, and I
suppose that alone is enough to render them contemptible .... [A] frequently
used canon is noscitur a sociis, which means, literally, "it is known by its com-
panions." It stands for the principle that a word is given meaning by those
around it. If you tell me, "I took the boat out on the bay," I understand "bay" to
mean one thing; if you tell me, "I put the saddle on the bay," I understand it to
mean something else ....
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25-26 (Princeton University Press 1997).
10. 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
11. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688 (quoting Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 688-89.
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ner because to do so would emasculate the use of § 10(b) 15 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Exchange
Act").16 To be actionable under § 10(b), a claim has to meet vari-
ous elements such as "scienter, reliance and causation ele-
ments."17  Broadly reading the term "prospectus" to include all
written communications would make § 10(b) virtually superfluous
because no one would rationally choose to sue under that section
with its heightened pleading and proof requirements when it
would be easier to establish liability under § 12(2). A broad inter-
pretation of "prospectus" in § 12(2) also "would create an anomaly
in that sellers in the aftermarket would be liable only for oral and
not written misrepresentations because the term 'prospectus' is
limited to initial offerings."18
The court also used the construction canon noscitur a sociis in
reviewing the whole of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act")19 to support its decision. The court noted the purpose of the
Securities Act was primarily "to establish safeguards for investors
in batch offerings of securities by establishing registration and
disclosure requirements designed in part to protect investors from
fraud and to promote ethical standards of honest and fair deal-
ing. ' 20 The court concluded that the Securities Act was intended
by Congress "to regulate initial offerings. '21 Nothing was found in
the legislative history or the structure of the Securities Act to in-
dicate any intent of Congress to include secondary offerings under
§ 12(2).22 The placement of § 12(2) between § 11 and § 13 of the
Securities Act supported this conclusion because §§ 11 and 13
dealt with initial distributions. 
23
The court of appeals considered the buyers' argument that, in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nafta-
lin,24 § 12(2) should be read consistent with § 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act, which made criminal certain fraudulent conduct. In Naf-
talin, the Court found that § 17(a) was applicable to secondary
markets and not limited to initial distributions. Judge Mans-
15. Id. at 689.
16. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78nn (2000).
17. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 689.
18. Id.
19. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (2000).
20. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 691.
24. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
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mann, writing for the court of appeals, opined that Naftalin was
not controlling because § 17(a), which was interpreted in Naftalin,
did not include the pertinent phrase at issue in Ballay-
"prospectus or oral communication." Naftalin, on the other hand,
dealt with an inherently broad phrase--"directly or indirectly...
to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment."25'5 Moreover, there was legislative history which reflected
Congress' intent to make § 17(a) applicable to secondary markets.
In conclusion, Judge Mansmann stated: "the language and legisla-
tive history of section 12(2), as well as its relationships to sections
17(a) and 10(b) within the scheme of the [Securities and Securities
Exchange] Acts, compel our conclusion that section 12(2) applies
only to initial offerings and not to aftermarket trading.
'26
B. Conflict Among the Circuits Raised by Pacific Dunlop
In Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 27 the issue pre-
sented was similar to the issue presented in Ballay, i.e, "the scope
of section 12(2) of the Securities Act." 28 In Pacific Dunlop, the
buyer of certain securities, Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. ("Pa-
cific"), entered into an agreement with a corporation and certain of
its shareholders to acquire stock of the corporation. The corpora-
tion whose stock was being acquired had earlier initiated an ini-
tial public offering of shares of stock, but that offering was unsuc-
cessful. A registration statement had been prepared in connection
with that offering, and, in the private transaction with Pacific,
there was a representation that the information in the registra-
tion statement was truthful. The corporation whose stock was
acquired by Pacific was "a holding company whose subsidiaries
engage in the manufacture and sale of industrial and lead acid
batteries and the recovery, smelting and sale of lead."2
9
Representations made in the stock purchase agreement in-
cluded that the corporation and its subsidiaries were in compli-
ance with environmental laws and regulations and that there
were no pending or threatened governmental investigations. In
fact, there were environmental claims asserted against the corpo-
ration. Pacific, the buyer, sought to rescind its stock acquisition.
25. Ballay, 925 F.2d. at 691 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000)).
26. Id. at 693.
27. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1160 (1994).
28. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 579.
29. Id.
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The sellers refused, and Pacific commenced a lawsuit asserting
that misrepresentations in the stock purchase agreement war-
ranted rescission under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. The district
court dismissed the lawsuit based upon Ballay. The court of ap-
peals in Pacific Dunlop rejected the Ballay holding that § 12(2)
does not apply to aftermarket trading.30 The court of appeals in
Pacific Dunlop noted that, while the Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the precise issue raised, there was some dicta that § 12(2)
would apply to dealers, arguably implicating that § 12(2) would be
applicable to aftermarket trading.31 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit also concluded that Ballay was in
conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the First and
Tenth Circuits.
32
The court of appeals in Pacific Dunlop reviewed the language of
§ 12, as well as the definition of the term "prospectus" in § 2(10) of
the Securities Act. Based upon a reading of the Securities Act, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the word
"prospectus" was "very broadly" defined.33 It also concluded that
"no single definition" of the term "prospectus" applied "throughout
the [Securities] Act." 34 The court in Pacific Dunlop agreed with
Ballay's conclusion that an oral communication contemplated by §
12(2) had to be related to a prospectus in order to be actionable
under that section. 35 The court disagreed, however, that § 12(2)
would be limited to initial offerings, finding that the definition of
the word "prospectus" set forth in § 2(10) of the Securities Act
warranted a broad reading of "prospectus" to include sales in the
secondary market. 36
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, like the court in
Ballay, looked to legislative history. While noting that some of the
legislative history would support the Ballay decision, it simply
disagreed that legislative history required a narrow meaning of
the term "prospectus."37 The court found the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Naftalin38 to be instructive because the Supreme
30. Id. at 580.
31. Id. at 581 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
32. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d
988 (1st Cir. 1940).
33. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582.
34. Id. at 584.
35. Id. at 588.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 592.
38. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
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Court there held § 17(a) of the Securities Act to encompass more
than the initial offerings and "applied to the entire selling proc-
ess." 39 Essentially for those reasons, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with Ballay and found that § 12(2)
would apply to secondary market trading as well as initial offer-
ings. 40
C. Supreme Court Supports Ballay's Conclusion
In 1995 the Supreme Court of the United States in Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., Inc.41 resolved the conflict between Pacific Dunlop and
Ballay.42 Gustafson was a five-to-four decision in which the Court
held that § 12(2) of the Securities Act does not provide a buyer a
right of rescission in a private secondary transaction. The theory
raised by the buyers in Gustafson was "that recitations in the pur-
chase agreement are part of a 'prospectus' 43 and thus are encom-
passed within § 12(2) of the Securities Act. The situation ad-
dressed in Gustafson began in 1989, when the shareholders of Al-
loyd, Inc. ("Alloyd"), a manufacturer of plastic packaging and
39. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 593.
40. Id. at 595.
41. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
42. In the interim period between the decision in Ballay and the decision in Gustafson,
the majority of courts that considered the issue raised in Ballay followed the rationale of
Ballay. See First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44
(11th Cir. 1993) ("[W~e are persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning [in Ballay] and hold
that § 12(2) of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions."); Reed v. Pruden-
tial Sec. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (recognizing that a minority of dis-
trict courts held that § 12(2) applied to sales in the secondary market, but following the
majority view, noting that "[clourts throughout the nation have followed the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Ballay, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
a circuit closely aligned with the Fifth Circuit); Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 823
F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting the minority view, but concluding that "the
Third Circuit authority [in Ballay] and other cases in this district holding that § 12(2) does
not apply to after market purchases are both more numerous and more persuasive"); Ben-
nett v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.S.C. 1992) (referring to several decisions
that had adopted a rational contrary to Ballay's rationale, but citing Ballay and concluding
"that the clear weight of authority supports [the] contention that section 12(2) does not
apply to secondary market transactions"); Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 794 F.
Supp. 1513, 1525 (D. Or. 1992) (following Ballay because to do otherwise would "ignore the
intention of Congress'); Budget Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v, Hirsch, 810 F. Supp. 1253, 1258
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (describing majority view, Ballay, and minority view, Farley v. Baird, Pat-
rick & Co., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. N.Y. 1990), finding "the reasoning of the majority
courts persuasive').
The minority view adopted by Pacific Dunlop was articulated in PPM Am., Inc. v.
Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970, 978 (D. Md. 1993) (disagreeing "with the conclusion
reached by the Third Circuit in Ballay concerning the 'structure' of the [Securities] Act" and
stating that "[t]hat reasoning is based on little more than the location of section 12(2) in the
[Securities] Act and ignores other provisions of the Act which reveal its true structure").
43. Gustafson, 531 U.S. at 564.
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automatic heat sealing equipment, engaged KPMG Peat Marwick
to facilitate a sale of their stock. Wind Point Partners II, L.P.
("Wind Point") agreed to purchase the shares of Alloyd through a
newly formed entity.
Wind Point conducted due diligence, and ultimately the transac-
tion was consummated. Included in the purchase agreement was
a material adverse change clause. The purchase agreement "also
provided that if the year-end audit and financial statements re-
vealed a variance between estimated and actual increased value,
the disappointed party would receive an adjustment. ' 44 A vari-
ance was found after the closing, and a year-end audit adjustment
of $815,000 in favor of the buyers was warranted. Rather than
accepting the adjustment, the buyers sought to rescind the pur-
chase agreement under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. The buyers
argued that the purchase agreement was in effect a prospectus
and contained statements which gave rise to a right to rescission
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act.
Suit was commenced by the buyers, and the district court, rely-
ing on Ballay, granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers.
The buyers appealed that decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which found that the district
court erred in relying on Ballay, by reason of Pacific Dunlop being
the appropriate rationale. The court of appeals applied Pacific
Dunlop to find that the word "prospectus" used in § 12(2) had a
broad meaning covering "all written communications that offered
the sale of a security."45 The sellers' petition for a writ of certio-
rari to the Supreme Court was granted.
The Supreme Court noted that there was no conflict among the
courts of appeals with respect to Ballay's finding that an oral
communication must be related to a prospectus in order to be ac-
tionable under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. 46 The conflict was
whether the term "prospectus" should be broadly construed to in-
clude secondary market transactions. 47 The Court resolved the
issue by looking to a consistent interpretation of the word "pro-
spectus" within the Securities Act, and applying the principle "to
construe statutes, not isolated provisions." 48  In doing so, the
Court examined "§ 2(10), which defines a prospectus; § 10, which
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id. at 566.
46. Id. at 567-68.
47. Id. at 568.
48. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568 (citations omitted).
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sets forth the information that must be contained in a prospectus;
and § 12, which imposes liability based on misstatements in a pro-
spectus." 49 The Court found that § 10 was limited to initial offer-
ings and not secondary market transactions. The Court compared
Ballay, which viewed the word "prospectus" in a narrow fashion,
to Pacific Dunlop, which rejected Ballay's view that the word "pro-
spectus" had to be limited as contemplated by §§ 10 and 12. The
Court agreed with Ballay, concluded "that the term 'prospectus'
must have the same meaning under §§ 10 and 12,"50 and applied
the statutory interpretation concept of construing terms consis-
tently within a statute.
The Court noted its finding was buttressed by the structure of
the Securities Act and commented that "[tihe primary innovation
of the [Securities] Act was the creation of federal duties-for the
most part, registration and disclosure obligations-in connection
with public offerings." 51 The Court, like Judge Mansmann in Bal-
lay, applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis-"a word is known by
the company he keeps."52 It found the doctrine was appropriate in
the context of § 12(2) of the Securities Act in order to avoid having
too broad a meaning for the term "prospectus," which would make
it "inconsistent with its accompanying words." 53 The Court also
referred to its earlier decision in Naftalin,54 which held that the
statutory language and legislative history of § 17(a) of the Securi-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 570.
51. Id. at 571.
52. Id. at 575.
53. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575. The Supreme Court recently utilized the canon of
noscitur a sociis. In Dolan v. United States Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481 (2006), the Su-
preme Court, in reversing a court of appeals' decision, held that a person who had tripped
and fallen over a bag as a result of mail being negligently left on a porch could sue for dam-
ages. The Court held that the United States Postal Service was not subject to the sovereign
immunity exception provided under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (2000).
In making its finding, the Court construed the phrase "loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter." The Court found that the terms 'loss" and "miscar-
riage" limited "the reach of transmission." Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. The Court quoted from
Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 304, the same decision cited in Ballay. See Washington State Dept. of
Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffier, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003) (rec-
ognizing "the established interpretive canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis";
citing, among other decisions, Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 519 (1803) ("It is a familiar rule in the construction of terms to apply to them the
meaning naturally attaching to them from their context. "Noscitur a sociis" is a rule of
construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is obscure or
of doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to
associated words; and the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to
the object of the whole clause in which it is used.").
54. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
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ties Act justified a broad reading to extend that provision to cover
secondary market trading. The Court found no comparable legis-
lative history with respect to § 12(2) and concluded that "[t]he in-
tent of Congress and the design of the statute required that §
12(2) liability be limited to public offerings."
55
The Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and held that the purchase
agreement in issue was not a prospectus and, therefore, not cov-
ered by § 12(2).56 In Gustafson it is easy to see the reflection of
the themes set forth by Judge Mansmann in Ballay: to construe §
12(2) to be consistent with the object of the Securities Act, to read
that section in context with the other sections prior to and follow-
ing it, and to apply the canon of noscitur a sociis as a means of
statutory construction in order to avoid having a meaning for the
term "prospectus" broader than intended by Congress.
D. Application of Ballay post-Gustafson
1. Securities Law
Ballay has been cited as authority for the elements of a claim
under § 12(2). In Gasner v. Board of Supervisors,57 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited Ballay for recognizing the six
elements that must be proven to establish a claim under § 12(2):
(1) that defendant offered or sold a security; (2) by the use of
any means of communication in interstate commerce; (3)
through a prospectus; (4) by making a false statement or
55. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578.
56. It should not go without mention that there were two vigorous dissents in Gustaf-
son. One dissent was authored by Justice Thomas, in which Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined, and the second dissent was authored by Justice Ginsburg, in which Justice
Breyer joined. In his dissent, Justice Thomas looked to the definition of "prospectus" in §
2(10) of the Securities Act. Justice Thomas found the term "prospectus" to be broadly de-
fined and therefore would not liken that term to a "mere 'term of art."' Gustafson, 513 U.S.
at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also found the interpretative tool noscitur
a sociis was not applicable because that canon should only be used "in cases of ambiguity."
Id. Justice Thomas did not view the definition of "prospectus" in § 2(10) of the Securities
Act as being ambiguous. He regarded the majority's position as "motivated by its policy
preference," id. at 594, which he felt was something that should be left for Congress, and
not for the Court, to determine. Justice Ginsburg, while joining in Justice Thomas' dissent,
also looked to the definition of the term "prospectus" in § 2(10) and to the legislative history
of § 12(2), as well as numerous commentators who "agreed that section 12(2), like section
17(a), is not confined to public offerings." Id. at 601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Like Justice
Thomas, Justice Ginsburg would have left any narrowing of § 12(2) to Congress.
57. 103 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1990).
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omission of material fact; (5) the untruth of which was known
by defendant but not known by plaintiff; and (6) that caused
plaintiffs damages.5 8
The primary import of Ballay in securities law, however, was
the adoption of its limited reading of the term "prospectus" by the
Supreme Court in Gustafson. While academics have criticized
Ballay and Gustafson,59 the analysis of Ballay utilized in Gustaf-
son remains the applicable interpretation of § 12(2) today.
2. Statutory Construction
Ballay is generally referenced today for its statutory construc-
tion analysis. In the seventh edition of Sutherland Statutory Con-
58. Gasner, 103 F.3d at 356.
59. The decision in Ballay was harshly criticized by the academic community. Profes-
sor Louis Loss and Professor Joel Seligman stated that the view adopted in Ballay to limit
§ 12(2) to initial offerings was "demonstrably wrong." Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 990 (3d ed. 1995). The criticism was originally
contained in two articles: Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV.
L. REV. 908 (1992), and Louis Loss, Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 BUS. LAW.
47 (1992). Professors Loss and Seligman would have applied the rationale of Naftalin to §
12(2) and extended the reach of § 12(2) to the secondary market. "In effect section 12(2) is
to section 17(a) what section 12(1) is to section 5." LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 990. They
found that the difference in the phrases referred to in Ballay to distinguish § 12(2) and §
17(a) was not persuasive because the remedy in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is
contemplated by Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, which was not adopted at the time of
the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act. The professors were also not persuaded by
the noscitur a sociis analysis relating to viewing § 12(2) in context with § 10. The profes-
sors commented that "[w]hen Congress intended that a prospectus should meet the very
particular requirements of §10, it said so expressly." Id. at 992. Also unpersuasive to the
professors was viewing § 12(2) in conjunction with § 11. What the professors saw as the
error in Ballay was the failure to "read the words in the relevant provisions." Id. at 993.
Notwithstanding such stern criticism, the Supreme Court in Gustafson found the Ballay
rationale persuasive.
Academic commentators' criticism continued after Gustafson. In 2 THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (5th ed. 2005), Professor Hazen
commented that the findings in Gustafson and Ballay were "unfortunate and erroneous."
Id. § 7.6, at 116. Professor Hazen's view is that the error occurred because the term "pro-
spectus" is not defined to have a restriction to initial offerings; rather, the term "on its
face,' applies to all written, television or radio offers to sell securities, including a sales
confirmation, and a contract to sell." Id. at 116-17. Professor Hazen also noted that
"[u]nfortunately, however, in a sharply divided five-to-four decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., the Supreme Court adopted an unduly restrictive reading of the scope of the § 12(2a)(2)
remedy. As a result of the Gustafson decision, it is clear that § (a)(2) will not be available
for most day-to-day transactions." Id. vol. 4, § 1426, at 476-77. See MARC I. STEINBERG,
SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDY § 6.04[1], at 6-11 - 6-13 (2007) (describ-
ing the authority prior to the decision in Gustafson and the consequences of the Gustafson
decision, noting "[i]n any event, Gustafson precludes application of the Section 12(a)(2)
right of action for private secondary (as well as private initial) transactions').
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struction,60 Ballay is cited as illustrative of the principle that "[iun
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, or other overrid-
ing evidence of a different meaning, technical terms or terms of
art used in a statute are presumed to have their technical mean-
ing."61 For a decision to be recognized in Sutherland Statutory
Construction is a matter of some distinction. Justice Antonin
Scalia described that treatise in A Matter of Interpretation:
There is to my knowledge only one treatise on statutory in-
terpretation that purports to treat the subject in a systematic
and comprehensive fashion - compared with about six or so
on the substantive field of contracts alone. That treatise is
Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction, first pub-
lished in 1891, and updated by various editors since, now em-
bracing some eight volumes. As its size alone indicates, it is
one of those law books that functions primarily not as a
teacher or adviser, but as a litigator's research tool and expert
witness - to say, and to lead you to cases that say, why the
statute should be interpreted the way your client wants.
62
Gustafson, whose rationale reflected Judge Mansmann's statutory
analysis, is also cited in Sutherland Statutory Construction. It is
the lead decision cited for the rule that "each part or section [of a
statute] should be considered in connection with every other part
or section to produce a harmonious whole."63
Professor Maxwell 0. Chibundu 64 commented extensively on the
Ballay decision in his article, Structure and Structuralism in the
Interpretation of Statutes.65 It was not so much the holding in
Ballay that was significant; rather, the significance was the ap-
proach to statutory analysis taken by Judge Mansmann. Profes-
sor Chibundu, while noting the criticisms that had been raised
with Ballay's holding by various commentators, 66 found Ballay's
method of statutory interpretation to be noteworthy. Professor
Chibundu reviewed the traditional methods of statutory interpre-
tation, i.e., plain meaning and legislative history, and noted that
60. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2007).
61. Id. § 47:29, at 474.
62. SCALIA, supra note 9, at 15.
63. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 60, § 46:5, at 190.
64. At the time Professor Chibundu wrote the article, he was an assistant professor of
law at the University of Maryland School of Law.
65. 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439 (1994).
66. Id. at 1440-41.
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while there were overtures to those statutory interpretation meth-
ods in Ballay, the primary focus of statutory construction in Bal-
lay was on structure. He commented that
[u]nhappiness with the use of legislative history, coupled with
the acceptance of the reality that in certain circumstances the
language of a statute is necessarily ambiguous, has resulted
in the recommendation of and ready resort to structure as a
tool of interpretation by many conservative judges. ... 67 The
methodology of utilizing structure to analyze a statute is the
process of relying on the placement or juxtaposition of items
of a statute one to another, or of a statute to other statutes.
Such relationships may vary from the placement of words
within a section, the placement of sections within a statute, or
the placement of statutes within a code.68
Professor Chibundu noted the use of the noscitur a sociis canon
could be problematical in some ways. 69 Professor Chibundu re-
ferred to the two aspects of structural analysis used in Ballay.
The first aspect was the use of the canon of noscitur a sociis. The
second aspect was to view the juxtaposition of ideas and the
framework of their application. By positing any text as a subpart
of a larger whole, the structural approach to interpretation pro-
ceeds in a tiered analysis, unveiling an item at a time in the belief
that, ultimately, the meaning of the specific text will be brought
out when a sufficient number of the layers of the legislative act
have been examined. 70 Examining structure is arguably a better
approach than looking to plain meaning and legislative history
alone. Structure uses both those methodologies and also offers a
true-to-life articulation of the forces at work that otherwise are
obfuscated by the claim of subservience to "text" or to "legislative
history" and that are ignored or unexplicated by the simple refer-
ence to "statutory purpose" or "policy."
71
The ultimate conclusion by Professor Chibundu in terms of the
significance of Ballay is that, while it utilized a structural analysis
to ascertain legislative intent, a better approach would have been
to use a structuralism methodology. That methodology "refers to a
mode of employing structural analysis in the critique or under-
67. Id. at 1463.
68. Id. at 1464.
69. Id.
70. Chibundu, supra note 55, at 1529.
71. Id. at 1538.
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standing of social institutions, experiences, and practices."72 As
an example of structural analysis, although not the structuralism
approach envisioned by Professor Chibundu, the Ballay decision
has withstood the test of time. Its approach to statutory analysis
has been followed not only in Gustafson, but in other decisions.
A relatively recent decision by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. J.W. Barclay & Co., Inc.,73 cited Ballay for two principles of
statutory construction. In J.W Barclay, the court of appeals ad-
dressed, among other things, whether a president of a defunct
broker-dealer could be jointly and severally liable with the broker-
dealer for an unpaid penalty. In administrative proceedings, the
broker-dealer was found liable for violating § 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and ordered to pay a penalty. When the broker-
dealer did not pay the penalty, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") commenced a suit against the broker-dealer
under § 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. 74 The SEC also as-
serted that the former president of the broker-dealer should be
found jointly and severally liable with the broker-dealer and re-
quested that the former president be ordered to pay the penalty.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the SEC against the
former president. The former president appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the
SEC lacked standing to bring the suit. In concluding that the SEC
had standing, the court of appeals, citing Ballay, reflected on the
need to avoid interpreting the statute "more broadly than its lan-
guage and the statutory scheme reasonably permit. '75 The court
of appeals looked at the scope of the statute primarily in light of
the language of the section quoted and cited Ballay76 for its "hold-
ing that the text of § 12(2) of the [Securities] Act did not create a
cause of action for an oral misrepresentation in the secondary
market."7
7
Judge Mansmann quoted Ballay in utilizing noscitur a sociis to
construe another statute. In Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. Demat-
teis/MacGregor, JV,78 the court of appeals in a decision authored
72. Id. at 1444 n.13.
73. 442 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 2006).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (2000).
75. J.W Barclay, 442 F.3d at 840 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1998), and
citing Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690 n.l).
76. 925 F.2d at 687-89.
77. J.W. Barclay, 442 F.3d at 840.
78. 209 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2000).
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by Judge Mansmann applied noscitur a sociis to construe a term
used in § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 79 finding that the term
"any interest" used in that section did not include affirmative de-
fenses.8
0
In In re Continental Airlines, Inc.,81 the court of appeals distin-
guished the analysis of Ballay in applying the canon of noscitur a
sociis. In Continental Airlines, Inc. the court of appeals was called
upon to construe § 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.8 2 The inquiry
was whether leased aircraft were exempt from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1110. Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Conti-
nental"), the debtor in that case, leased certain aircraft as a fi-
nancing technique and not to acquire those airplanes. Continental
argued that the exemption from the automatic stay provided in §
1110 should be limited to leases resulting from acquisition financ-
ing. The bankruptcy court found in Continental's favor and ap-
plied § 1110 only to acquisition leases.
On appeal, Continental argued that the canon of noscitur a so-
ciis should be applied to determine that § 1110 was limited to ac-
quisition leases, noting that § 1110 "applies to 'conditional sale
contracts' and 'purchase money, equipment, security interests,"'
which are acquisition devices.8 3 The court of appeals disagreed,
noting that the canon "is merely an aid in determining the intent
of the drafters."8 4 The language in § 1110 was found to be un-
qualified and not facially ambiguous. In so doing, the court dis-
tinguished Ballay.
It recognized that in Ballay the court "held that § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 does not apply to sellers of securities in the
secondary market."8 5 It noted that noscitur a sociis was used to
interpret the term "prospectus" which was a general term, but
that it
did so only in conjunction with an analysis of legislative his-
tory and policy concerns indicating Congress' clear intent. We
noted that the term "prospectus" did not apply to secondary
offerings, and that distinguishing between oral and written
communication would make "no logical sense.". .. In addition,
79. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
80. Folger, 209 F.3d at 264.
81. 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
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we stressed that the legislative history and structure of the
[Securities] Act, and its relation to the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, revealed Congress' clear intent to regulate only
initial offerings.
8 6
The court did not disavow the rationale of Ballay. As noted, it
commented that the legislative history, policy, and structure of
Congressional acts were important in applying the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis to a general term.8 7
III. CONCLUSION
What can a friend say about the judicial wisdom of Carol Los
Mansmann? Her work lives in her opinions and speaks for itself.
It is noteworthy that Ballay was cited for its persuasive rationale
in convincing a majority of lower courts to follow Judge Mans-
mann's interpretation of § 12(2). The United States Supreme
Court in Gustafson adopted the conclusion of Ballay. The struc-
tural analysis utilized in Ballay to interpret § 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act is a testament to Judge Mansmann's intellect and wis-
dom.
Remembering Carol and having this opportunity to reflect on
her judicial legacy was, as noted previously, poignant and mean-
ingful for me as her friend and as a jurist. The greatest legacy of
the Honorable Carol Los Mansmann, however, lies not only in re-
membering her as the author of significant opinions; but also in
remembering her as a mentor for both lawyers and judges. Her
memory lives in the lawyers and judges who had the good fortune
to know her. I am thankful to have been one of the privileged to
be mentored by Judge Mansmann. She is and will continue to be
greatly missed.
86. Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
87. Id.

